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Abstract: I argue that there is a human right to vital pharmaceuticals, not in the sense that 
anybody has a claim right to the provision of pharmaceuticals that are not yet available, 
but in the sense that access to pharmaceuticals must not be limited by means of 
overblown private intellectual property right. Contrary to what is customary, my 
argument in support of such a human right draws on foundational considerations about 
intellectual property. My analysis is to some extent driven by exploring parallels between 
a Global Common and an Intellectual Common, to both of which all of humanity would 





1. To the extent that this is a matter of law, one can make a case that there is a human 
right to vital pharmaceuticals, such as those on the World Heath Organization’s list of 
essential medicines. Yet while lawyers explore what such a right amounts to and if it 
conflicts with the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPs), our concern is to explore if philosophical approaches to human rights deliver a 
right to pharmaceuticals -- specifically, if there is such a right according to a conception I 
have recently offered, which regards human rights as membership rights in the global 
order, where one basis for membership is humanity’s collectively owning the earth.
1 
                                                 
1 Many thanks to audiences in my human rights class at the Harvard Kennedy School, at the Department of 
Political Science at the University of Utah, and at the Program in Ethics and Health at Harvard, where I 
presented this material in November 2008. Thanks also to Norman Daniels, Nir Eyal, and Dan Wikler for 
helpful exchanges. Hestermeyer (2007) sums up the state of the art in the legal debate; see also Toebes 
(1999). Sell (2003) discusses the background to TRIPs and the history of intellectual property 
arrangements. See Maskus and Reichman (2005a) on general developments in intellectual property 
protection at the global level. The WHO’s lists of essential medicines is at 
http://www.who.int/topics/essential_medicines/en. For my conception of human rights, see Risse (2009a), 
Risse (2009b) and Risse (forthcoming). I take the concept of human rights to refer to rights that are 
  1In a nutshell: Yes, there is a human right to essential pharmaceuticals. Yet we 
must be careful in assessing precisely what kind of right this is. My argument does not 
deliver a right that anybody provide pharmaceuticals that are not generally available, or 
not yet available at all.
2 Instead, I show that it is owed to people across the world that 
intellectual property generally and vital pharmaceutical in particular not be regulated in a 
way that acknowledges far-reaching private intellectual property rights – especially at the 
global level. In that sense, there indeed is a human right to pharmaceuticals.   
My conclusions follow from reflections on the possibility of private intellectual 
property, rather than a more customary appeal to more foundational rights to welfare or 
health (care). Therefore much of what I argue should be useful even to those who reject 
my conception of human rights.
3 The question of what support there is for a right to vital 
pharmaceuticals arises separately for each conception of human rights. Addressing it 
within the confines of my conception should be of particular interest since considerations 
                                                                                                                                                 
invariant with respect to local conventions, institutions, culture, or religion. I take it that the focus of the 
human rights language is on abuses committed by those in positions of authority: of two otherwise identical 
acts one may be a human rights violation, but not the other, depending on whether they can be interpreted 
as abusing authority. (On this, see Pogge (2002), pp 57 ff.)  A conception of human rights adds contents to 
the concept, and consists of four elements: First, a list of these rights; second, an account of the basis on 
which individuals have them (i.e., of what features turn individuals into rights holders); third, an account of 
why that list has that particular composition, that is, a principle or process that generates it; and fourth, an 
account of who has to do what to realize these rights, that is, an account of the corresponding obligations. 
The universality captured by the concept of human rights and our human rights practices render it 
implausible that there is a single philosophically most sensible conception of human rights. As I explain 
below, my conception has some virtues, but also shortcomings, in terms of its ability to capture human 
rights discourse.  
 
2 To that end, the argument of this study can interact effectively with work on incentive-setting for the 
pharmaceutical industry, see Kremer and Glennerster (2004) and Pogge (2008a) and (2008b).  
 
3 My argument is indeed made complex by the fact that I am primarily exploring the subject matter of this 
essay from the standpoint of my conception of human rights. What should be of general interest is (a) the 
parallel between the Global Common and the Intellectual Common, and (b) my argument for constraints on 
the extent of private intellectual property rights that in turn ends up being independent of any ontological 
characterization of the objects of intellectual property law (in terms of an Intellectual Common or any other 
manner) and thus holds at considerable generality.  
 
  2of collective ownership play an important role in both that conception and the debate 
about the possibility of private intellectual property. While reflections about a Global 
Common are at the core of my conception, reflections about an Intellectual Common 
inform debates about intellectual property. An exploration of how these approaches 
interact underlies the subsequent discussion throughout. 
I proceed in three steps. First (in sections 2-5), I establish the link between human 
rights and collective ownership. Individuals possess a set of natural rights that 
characterize their status as co-owners. The existence of sates puts these rights in 
jeopardy, and a set of associative rights must ensure states preserve these natural rights. 
These associative rights provide us with a conception of human rights, such rights being 
membership rights in the global order. The standpoint of collective ownership serves as 
one basis for deriving these rights. While this view may strike many as missing the point 
of human rights, it has its virtues: it rests on foundations that should be universally 
acceptable; can show why the language of “rights” rather than goals is apt here; and 
entails a global responsibility for these rights. That humanity collectively owns the earth 
was a predominant idea in 17
th century political philosophy: Grotius, Hobbes, Pufendorf, 
Locke, and others debated how to capture this status and the conditions under which parts 
of the Global Common can be privatized.
4 Although these views were religiously 
motivated, we can revitalize this standpoint non-theologically. Doing so is sensible in 
light of all those problems of global reach that have recently preoccupied us. 
One area where an idea of collective ownership has had an impact is intellectual 
property, which leads to the second step of my argument (sections 6-8). Just as there is a 
                                                 
4 See Buckle (1991) and Tuck (1999) for these discussions.  
 
  3Global Common, so the set of ideas may form an Intellectual Common. Those who 
“have” ideas are then not inventors or creators, but explorers or discoverers. What claims 
to controlling the use of ideas there can be would have to be assessed in light of the point 
that such ideas originally belong to a Common. This approach draws on Locke’s 
discussion in Chapter V of the Second Treatise, a discussion so influential in theorizing 
about property that Drahos (1996) assigns to it “totemic status” (p 41). In that chapter, 
Locke merges his account of collective ownership with a labor-based (“mixing”) 
approach to privatization. Since many commentators have thought they transfer readily to 
intellectual property, Locke’s ideas have inspired a particular approach to intellectual 
property in terms of an Intellectual Common. Rather than Locke, however, my effort to 
revitalize the standpoint of collective ownership appeals to Hugo Grotius.  
Like no other work in the philosophy of international relations, Grotius’ De Jure 
Belli ac Pacis Libri Tres (DJB), Three Books on the Law of War and Peace, published in 
1625, makes ownership of the earth central to the relations among both individuals and 
political entities. Grotius’ concern is with the “differences of those who do not 
acknowledge one common Civil Right whereby they may and ought to be decided” 
(I.1.I), differences he seeks to regulate non-parochially. By making collective ownership 
central, Grotius formulates a version of a standpoint of what one may call global public 
reason. I develop the first step of my argument from a Grotian standpoint, although it 
matters little whether we choose a Grotian or, say, a Lockean starting point there. I take a 
Grotian starting point for the second step too, but now the Grotian origins matter.  
Grotius is best known for his views on the freedom of the seas. Throughout his 
writings, he argues in different ways that the seas cannot be owned. Assessing his 
  4arguments leads to reflections about the conditions under which anything that is 
originally collectively owned can be privatized. While Grotius’ reasons no longer fit the 
case of the seas, they do fit the case of intellectual property, as long as we can classify the 
objects of intellectual property as belonging to an Intellectual Common. What Grotius 
says about the sea helps make a case against private intellectual property rights beyond 
what we need to compensate inventors or perhaps set incentives for future inventions. 
Strikingly, a similar argument is available if there is no Intellectual Common. What 
emerges, and what this second step of my argument mainly provides, is a general case 
against the possibility of private intellectual property beyond compensation and 
incentive-setting wherever intellectual property is regulated – a case that does in no way 
depend on whether there in fact is an Intellectual Common.
5   
The third step (sections 9 and 10) connects the first two. In the first step we saw 
that collective ownership was one basis from which to derive human rights qua 
membership rights in the global order. But collective ownership is not the only basis from 
which we can derive global membership rights. Other such bases include global 
interconnectedness, enlightened self-interest, and independent moral reasons that must be 
acknowledged at the global level and that are tied to global obligations. Any argument 
seeking to show that X is a human right in this sense must show that the matter is indeed 
of genuinely global concern and is appropriately captured as a right.  
                                                 
5 Reed (2006) applies Grotian ideas to the gene pool (using the analogy to the sea), but seems to believe 
these ideas are of use only to Christians. Much of the second part of this essay engages with Shiffrin 
(2001), who has explored related considerations within Locke’s approach to property. For introductions to 
the philosophical concerns behind intellectual property law, see Shiffrin (2007). See also Kuflik (1989) and 
Fisher (2001). For a discussion of these issues specifically with regard to patents, see Sterckx (2005). 
Lessig (2004) argues for very limited copy-rights, which is kindred in spirit to the present argument. But as 
should become clear, my approach speaks more to patents than to copyrights.  
 
  5The second step itself entails that wherever intellectual property is regulated, 
private intellectual property is acceptable only within the limits sketched. This result does 
not depend on my conception of human rights. Yet putting the first two steps together, we 
also find that there is a human right to vital pharmaceuticals, in the sense that such 
pharmaceuticals ought to be regulated at the global level and that private rights to them 
should be constrained as before. To make this point within the confines of my 
conception, we need to establish that the regulation of a sub-domain of intellectual 
property is of genuinely global concern, one that includes essential pharmaceuticals. To 
that end, I argue that the second step lets us conclude that the constraints on the 
regulation of that sub-domain offer the sort of independent moral reason that is of 
genuinely global concern. There indeed is a human right to essential pharmaceuticals.
6  
 
2. To introduce the standpoint of collective ownership, let me touch on a few themes 
from Grotius. Grotius offers this account of collective ownership of the earth:
7  
                                                 
6 Buckley and O Tuama (2005) and De George (2005) deal with pricing issues in the pharmaceutical 
industry. Questions there concern what profits would be justified given what risks and difficulties that 
industry faces, but also given how much they benefit from public subsidies. For a perspective on these 
matters skeptical of the pharmaceutical industry, see Angell (2004). See also Cohen et al. (2006). Other 
important issues in this literature include the question of what areas this industry should invest in, possibly 
at the exclusion of others; and how to market products. One important question is also to what extent 
regulation of  intellectual property is causal to a lack of access to medication, and what remedies there 
might be. Kremer and Glennerster (2004) and Pogge (2008a) and (2008b) make proposals for how to 
change the incentives of the pharmaceutical industry to make medications available to the poor. Maskus 
and Reichman (2005b) argue that TRIPs has given rise to a transnational system of innovation that could 
produce powerful incentives to innovate for the benefit of mankind, if developed properly. A crucial 
question about TRIPs is whether there is any sense in which the regulation proposed by that agreement is in 
the “enlightened” self-interest of developing countries.   
 
7 I quote from DJB in the customary way, for instance “ II.2.II.1.” this means: Second volume; second 
book; second chapter; first section. The 2005 Liberty Fund edition is especially accessible. I also deal with 
Grotius’ earlier work, Mare Liberum, Free Sea, which is part of a much larger work, De Jure Praedae 
Commentarius, Commentary on the Law of Prize and Booty, which, however, only became available in full 
in the 19
th century. For Mare Liberum, I quote the pages from the 2004 Liberty Fund edition.  
 
  6Almighty God at the creation, and again after the Deluge, gave to Mankind in general 
a Dominion over Things of this inferior World. All Things, as Justin has it, were at 
first common, and all the World had, as it were, but one Patrimony. From hence it 
was, that every Man converted what he would to his own Use, and consumed 
whatever was to be consumed; and such a Use of the Right common to all Men did at 
that time supply the Place of Property, for no Man could justly take from another, 
what he had thus first taken to himself; which is well illustrated by that Simile of 
Cicero, Tho’ the Theatre is common for any Body that comes, yet the Place that every 
one sits in is properly his own. And this State of Things must have continued till now, 
had Men persisted in their primitive Simplicity, or lived together in perfect 
Friendship. (DJB, II.2.II.1) 
  
God’s gift can rightfully be put to use without any agreement. But this only works under 
primitive conditions, and does not even include a right to recover things left behind. 
Agreement is needed to create further-reaching rights, at least according to the account in 
De Jure Belli ac Pacis. Still, God’s gift makes clear that the earth is for the use of human 
beings. As Buckle (1991) puts it, ”in using the world for their own ends, human beings 
are not strangers (or trespassers) on a foreign soil. They are at home” (p 95). 
  Once primitive conditions have been left behind, property arrangements are 
conventional. To be adequate, these conventions must mind the fact that the earth was 
originally given to humankind collectively. One implication of this point is the 
postulation of a “right of necessity;” for   
in a case of Absolute Necessity, that antient Right of using Things, as if they still 
remained common, must revive, and be in full Force: For in all Laws of human 
Institution, and consequently, in that of Property too, such cases seem to be 
excepted. (DJB, II.2.VI.2) 
 
This right does not derive from charity (II.2.VI.4). Instead, it restricts private property 
rights as they could have been intended, or at any rate, their legitimate scope. After all, in 
addition to his account of the divine gift, Grotius also offer an account of natural rights 
that include “the Abstaining from that which is another’s, and the Restitution of what we 
  7have of another’s, or of the Profit we have made by it, the Obligation of fulfilling 
Promises, the Reparation of a Damage done through our own Default, and the Merit of 
Punishment among Men.” Society was formed for the protection of what is one’s own, 
the  suum  (DJB, I.2.I.5), and a sphere of what is ours exists prior to actual property 
arrangements. Whereas Hobbes thought the most basic insight one could make 
uncontroversial was that everybody had a right to self-preservation, Grotius started with a 
number of laws of nature in which what individuals have a right to is spelled out in ways 
meant to be reasonable for everybody. Grotius is guided by solidaristic assumptions, and 
an understanding of humanity as susceptible to moral motivation in principle.
   
Some limitations to property are not rights of necessity but general restrictions of 
what may be claimed under any conditions. Others may avail themselves of innocent 
profits (e.g., sail on our rivers), or demand free passage (even when trading with third 
parties, II.2.XI-XIII), rights that if denied can be claimed by force (II.2.XIII.3). People 
may rest ashore to recover from a journey, even build “a little Cottage” (II.2.XV.2), and 
seek “a fixed Abode” (II.2.XVI.2) if prosecuted at home, assuming they abide by local 
laws. Products must be sold at reasonable prices if they are not needed by the producers 
(II.2.XIX). Even the right to marriage ought not to be denied, women apparently being 
part of the common stock (II.2.XXI). All these rights are owed to all, not just a selected 
few (II.2.XXII). These strong constraints on ownership are much at odds with our current 
practices. As a striking illustration, consider cases of forced immigration:  
And if there be any waste or barren Land within our Dominions, that also is to be 
given to Strangers, at their Request, or may be lawfully possessed by them, because 
whatever remains uncultivated, is not to be esteemed Property, only so far as 
concerns Jurisdiction, which always continues the Right of the antient People. 
(II.2.XVII). 
  8 
We will elaborate on this theme below, when discussing Grotius’ account of the 
ownership of the seas, but what these cases make clear already is that the collective 
ownership status of earth, in conjunction with the additional natural rights Grotius 
postulates, puts considerable limitations on the possibility of privatization.  
  
3. While Grotius took the biblical standpoint of the earth as a divine gift, like Locke he 
held that this view should be acceptable even if humankind had never received that 
revelation. Indeed, the view that the earth originally belongs to humankind collectively is 
plausible without religious input. Philosophically, we have much to gain by developing 
the idea that humanity collectively owns the earth, since this status affects what people 
can do with portions of the planet. Among other things, this standpoint generates 
constraints on what immigration policies to adopt (see Blake and Risse (2007), Blake and 
Risse (forthcoming)); it also leads to a conception of human rights. Two points are 
obvious enough: first, the resources of the earth are valuable and necessary for any 
human activities to unfold; and second, those resources have come into existence without 
human interference. These points must be considered when individual accomplishments 
are used to justify property rights strong enough to determine use across generations.
8   
Egalitarian Ownership is the view that the earth originally belongs to humankind 
collectively: all humans, no matter when and where they are born, must have some sort of 
symmetrical claim to it. (“Original” ownership does not connote with time but is a moral 
status.) This is the most plausible view of original ownership, because of the two points 
                                                 
8 Much has been written on foundations of property; see Becker (1977), Reeve (1986), or Ryan (1987).  
 
  9above: that the existence of resources is nobody’s accomplishment, whereas they are 
needed for any human activities to unfold. Egalitarian Ownership is detached from the 
complex set of rights and duties civil law delineates under the heading of property law 
(Honore (1961)). At this level of abstraction from conventions and codes that themselves 
have to be assessed in relation to views on original ownership, all Egalitarian Ownership 
states is that all humans have a symmetrical claim to original resources.  
One may say that the term “ownership” is misleading here, but I use it since there 
is this connection to the familiar, thicker notions of ownership in civil law; and we are, 
after all, concerned with what sorts of claims individuals have to resources. To be sure, 
the considerations motivating Egalitarian Ownership speak to raw materials only, not to 
what human beings have made of them. The distinction between what “is just there” and 
what has been shaped by humans is blurred, say, for land human beings have wrested 
from the sea, or for natural gas harnessed from garbage deposits. But by and large, we 
understand well enough the idea of what exists without human interference.
9  
We must now assess different conceptions of Egalitarian Ownership. Such 
conceptions differ in how they understand the symmetry of claims individuals have to 
original resources. There are, roughly, four types of ownership-status an entity may have: 
no ownership; joint ownership -- ownership directed by collective preferences; common 
                                                 
9 A more difficult question is under what conditions man-made products, including improvements of 
original resources, should no longer be accompanied by special entitlements of those who made them or 
their offspring. See Blake and Risse (forthcoming) for discussion.  Egalitarian Ownership formulates a 
standing demand on all groups that occupy parts of the earth to inhabit the earth in a manner that respects 
this symmetrical status of individuals with regard to resources. That Egalitarian Ownership operates in this 
way should be intelligible and acceptable even within cultures where individuals are not seen as property 
owners. Nothing about Egalitarian Ownership precludes such cultures from being acceptable to their 
members even if they do not treat individuals themselves as property holders. Yet even cultures that do not 
see individuals themselves as property holders must indeed be acceptable to those who live in them 
especially because all individuals have symmetrical claims to original resources. 
 
  10ownership – in which the entity belongs to several individuals, each equally entitled to 
using it within constraints; and private ownership. Common ownership is a right to use 
something that does not exclude others from also using it. If the Boston Common were 
held as common ownership when it was used for cattle, a constraint on each person’s use 
could be to bring no more than a certain number of cattle, a condition motivated by 
respect for co-owners and the concern to avoid the Tragedy of the Commons. Yet if they 
held the Common in joint ownership, each individual use would be subject to a decision 
process to be concluded to the satisfaction of each co-owner. Joint ownership ascribes to 
each co-owner property rights as extensive as rights of private ownership, except that 
others hold the same rights: each co-owner must be satisfied on each form of use.   
So there are various interpretations of Egalitarian Ownership: resources could be 
jointly owned, commonly owned, or each person could have private ownership of an 
equal share of resources (or a value equivalent). These conceptions carve out a pre-
institutional space of natural rights that constrain property conventions which in turn 
regulate what natural rights leave open. I submit that Common Ownership is the most 
plausible conception.
10 While I cannot offer a complete argument for this proposal here, I 
offer elaboration on what common ownership means, what it entails, and why it should 
be preferred to the other conceptions as an interpretation of Egalitarian Ownership.
11  
  The core idea of common ownership is that all co-owners ought to have an equal 
opportunity to satisfy their needs to the extent that this turns on obtaining collectively 
                                                 
10 In capital letters, “Joint Ownership” and “Common Ownership” are names of interpretations of 
Egalitarian Ownership and hence views about ownership of the earth, whereas in small letters “joint 
ownership” and “common ownership” are general forms of ownership of anything.  I continue to say that 
humanity “collectively” owns the earth if the precise form of ownership does not matter. 
 
11 Risse (2005) offers supportive arguments, showing why other conceptions are problematic. I develop all 
of this at length in my forthcoming book on The Grounds of Justice. See also Risse (2009a)  
 
  11owned resources. This formulation, first, emphasizes an equality of status; second, it 
points out that this equality of status concerns opportunities to satisfy needs (whereas 
there is no sense in which each co-owner would be entitled to an equal share of what is 
collectively owned, let alone to the support of others in getting such a share, any more 
than any co-owners of the Boston Common had a claim to such a share or to the support 
of others to obtain it); and third, it does so insofar as these needs can be satisfied with 
resources that are collectively owned (that is, nothing at all is said about anything to 
which the original intuitions motivating Egalitarian Ownership do not apply).  
To put this in the Hohfeldian rights terminology, common ownership rights must 
minimally include liberty rights accompanied by what Hart (1982) calls a “protective 
perimeter” of claim rights (p 171).
12 To have a liberty right is to be free of any duty to the 
contrary. Common ownership rights must include at least rights of that sort; that is, co-
owners are under no duty to refrain from using any resources. But the symmetry of 
claims postulated by Egalitarian Ownership demands more than liberty rights. In light of 
the intuitions supporting Egalitarian Ownership, to count as an interpretation of it, 
Common Ownership must guarantee minimal access to resources, that is, impose duties 
to refrain from interference with certain forms of use of resources. Therefore we must 
add that protective perimeter of claim rights to the liberty rights. We obtain enough 
mileage from the original intuitions to require that common ownership rights (for 
Common Ownership to serve as an interpretation of Egalitarian Ownership) be conceived 
of in sufficientarian terms, in the sense that no co-owner should interfere with actions of 
                                                 
12 For the Hohfeld terminology, see Jones (1994), chapter 1; Edmundson (2004), chapter 5; Wenar (2005). 
  
  12others if they serve to satisfy basic needs. These intuitions cannot be pressed beyond that. 
Equal Division and Joint Ownership both press them too far.  
Yet we do have to add one more right. We must also make sure individuals can 
maintain their co-ownership status under more complex arrangements. A necessary 
condition for the acceptability of such arrangements is that the core purpose of the 
original rights can still be met. That core purpose is to make sure co-owners have the 
opportunity to meet their basic needs. In Hohfeldian terminology, co-owners have an 
immunity from living under political and economic arrangements that interfere with the 
ability of those subject to them having such opportunities.  
   
4. Yet although humanity owns the earth collectively, and although the high seas and 
Antarctica are treated as a Global Common,
13 the remaining land is covered by states. 
The imposition of a system of states that divide up the world’s resources needs to be 
reconciled with Common Ownership, on two grounds. First, each state imposes a 
complex system of political and economic relationships that determines which, if any, 
original resources individuals have access to. Second, a system of states imposes a 
system of ownership where groups claim (group-specific) collective ownership for 
certain regions. Co-owners are excluded from exercising rights with regard to much of 
what is collectively owned. So a state system (regardless of its moral virtues or prudential 
advantages) generates two problems for co-owners: it exposes them to the ex ante risks 
and ex post reality of finding themselves in conditions where their moral status as co-
owners can be exercised at most in rudimentary ways if at all; and it allows them only 
                                                 
13 See Malanczuk (1997), pp 149f and pp 184 ff. Outer space is also treated in this way.  
 
  13limited exit options (if any) if they find themselves with an abusive government. In virtue 
of the concentrations of power that it includes, a state system has the power to violate the 
rights of co-owners, both by undermining their opportunities to satisfy their basic needs 
and by impeding their ability to relocate.  
It is under these conditions that we must ask what to make of the immunity that 
individuals have from living under political and economic arrangements that interfere 
with those subject to them having opportunities to satisfy their basic needs. The relevant 
arrangement to which individuals are subject in this case is not merely the state in which 
they live, but the system of states per se. Each state, in virtue of its immediate access to 
individuals’ body and assets, might deprive them of such opportunities, but so, crucially, 
might other states by refusing them entry if they cannot satisfy their basic needs where 
they live. At any rate, the claim just made is true of states that do have the ability the let 
people enter and allow them to satisfy their basic needs without making it impossible for 
some of their own citizens to do so. When individuals cannot satisfy their basic needs 
where they live, other states that have this ability but refuse entry would not merely fail 
to come to their aid; they would deny them the opportunity to satisfy these needs.
14  
                                                 
14 (1) One might say that generally individuals who are threatened where they live do not have the 
opportunity to travel to another state to ask for entry, and therefore such states would not contribute to their 
predicament but merely fail to come to their aid. At any rate, they would only contribute to the predicament 
of those who make it to their borders and are turned away. But this under-describes the extent to which a 
state system based on self-determination and inviolability of territory contributes to such predicaments. 
Were our world no longer committed to such principles and were rich states more inclined to admit people 
who arrive at their borders because, say, their ability to make a living is threatened in their country of 
origin, organizations would spring up that specialize in making sure such individuals get to wealthier 
destinations. Such individuals would pay for these services by pledging future income, or charitable 
organizations would do this job.  (2) One might also object as follows: Suppose we own a boat together and 
somebody interferes with your use of it. This would not mean I have to stop that interference or else let you 
use the boat when I am entitled to using it. But this is a wrong comparison. If we own the boat in common 
and this situation arises, and we are all in the boat, then you would have to give me refuge on your side, at 
least as long as the boat does not thereby turn over.  
 
  14Common ownership rights are natural and pre-institutional. Once institutions are 
founded, guarantees must be given to co-owners that institutional power will not be used 
to violate their status. Since such a violation is threatened by the system of states per se, 
such guarantees assume the form of moral demands against that system of states. 
Responsibilities that arise in this manner must be allocated at the level of the state 
system, as collective responsibilities, rather than resting exclusively with individual states 
and then only with regard to their members. I explain below why it makes sense to think 
of the rights thus derived – those rights that guarantee that individuals’ status as equal co-
owners be preserved, regardless of what particular property arrangements hold across the 
globe – as membership rights in the global order and why such membership rights in turn 
offer a plausible (alas non-standard) conception of human rights. But before doing so, let 




5. One question that naturally arises on Grotius’ account of collective ownership (mutatis 
mutandis for all such accounts) is whether all of the divine gift can be occupied at the 
exclusion of others. Grotius famously responded negatively, arguing that the sea could 
and should not be so occupied. His reasoning is of interest to us since it bears on 
questions about intellectual property. Grotius’ work contains two accounts of private 
property, and so two ways of generating the question of whether everything can be 
                                                 
15 My view does not presuppose that individuals “participate” in the global order. Even secluded tribes 
possess human rights. They are co-owners of the earth and are constrained by the imposition of the state 
system even if they do not actually feel the constraints. In the case of such tribes there presumably are 
unusually strong reasons to set aside enforcement of human rights. Yet if by any chance humans are 
discovered on the back side of the moon, the considerations explored in this study would not apply to them. 
That does not mean one can do with them as one pleases. But as they would not be members of the global 
order, these considerations would not bear on their moral status.  
  15appropriated. According to De Jure Belli, the original common property is divided ever 
more, in response to changing socio-economic arrangements (II.2.II.5). People realize 
that adjustments are necessary, make agreements to that effect, or accept them tacitly. 
First occupancy decides who gets to privatize what.
16 At the beginning of DJB II.2.III, 
following his views about privatization, Grotius explains that the sea is excluded from 
privatization because it is big enough for everybody’s use. This emphasis relates to his 
point in II.2.II, that the arrangement of common use served the same purpose as the 
subsequent introduction of private property. For the sea no new property regime was 
needed to ensure arrangements under different conditions serve the original purpose.  
The earlier Mare Liberum (ML) also explains the process by which things became 
“proper.”  Again we read that at the earliest stage there merely exists a right to use. But 
Mare Liberum does not turn on agreements to explain what happens next. Grotius 
distinguishes between two stages of private acquisition (ML, pp 22f). First, acts of use 
create special relationships between things and certain individuals. Sometimes use 
amounts to consumption, thus to abuse: the apple I eat is no longer left for others to use 
similarly. Other things are made worse by being used. A form of private ownership is 
then inseparable from use. At the second stage, Grotius explains that something similar 
also occurs in other cases. The passage speaks of “a certain reason” (the Latin word being 
“ratio”). The value of assigning objects to specific people is realized: the “ratio” was that 
occupation often changes objects of use. Instead of compacts modifying common use, 
private ownership arises through natural extensions of use.  
                                                 
 
16 See DJB, II.2.II.5, but also II.3.1 and II.3.IV.1, and in II.8.VI.  
 
  16Grotius next assesses the limitation of appropriation, especially regarding the seas 
(p 24). The centrality of occupation as basis for private ownership becomes clear again.
17 
One reason why Grotius rejects the idea that some people can lay claims to the seas here 
is that the seas cannot be occupied. The mechanism that explains which individual would 
be the owner at the exclusion of others does not apply to the seas. Even if occupation 
were possible, it would be wickedness because the gains for occupiers would not depend 
on excluding others. There appears to be a tension between De Jure Belli and Mare 
Liberum, as one of them but not the other gives an important role to convention. Yet the 
point in both is that the earth belongs to everybody, but that it is left to the will of men to 
develop this gift. Precisely how particular arrangements come about is inessential, as long 
as the changes continue to make sense of the original situation of equity, and the changes 
are reasonable adjustments to new circumstances given Grotius’ starting points.
18  
Behind Grotius’ reasoning, we can reconstruct a conservative principle of 
occupation: unless there is a good reason to exclude people from parts of the earth, they 
should not be excluded. Although consistent with occupation at the exclusion of others 
under certain conditions, collective ownership also imposes obstacles to it. Collective 
ownership creates a reference point from which departures must be justified. (Recall the 
Grotian right of necessity and the inherent limitations to privatization.) The founding of 
political communities is a good reason for exclusion, and thus one way to meet that 
presumption against privatization: Grotius takes no issue especially with the existence of 
                                                 
17 On the importance of occupation, see ML, p 24, p 34. On p 116 we read that, if things cannot remain 
common, they become the property of the first taker, both because the uncertainly of ownership could not 
otherwise be avoided, and also because it was equitable that a premium be put upon diligence.  
 
18 See also Buckle (1991), p 43.  
 
  17states. Still, the burden of proof is on those who wish to legitimize occupation at the 
exclusion of others. As Grotius saw it, that burden could not be met for the sea.
19  
 
6. Nowadays the sea can be monitored by air and water, so differences between the 
ability to occupy land and water are a matter of degree. Nor does it still hold that use by 
one party leaves intact what others could do with the sea: that much is true for ships 
traveling through, but not for fishing and seabed exploitation. Writing in the late 19
th 
century, Henry Sidgwick realized that Grotius’ argument had expired with regard to 
fisheries (Sidgwick (2005), p 228), and worries about over-fishing have only increased 
since then.  Complete freedom of the seas would no longer be called for on Grotius’ 
terms. Yet Grotius’ reasoning also bears on a different domain, the products of the mind, 
such as scientific, musical, literary, or other artistic works and inventions, but also 
images, names, symbols, or design patterns. These products are subject to intellectual 
property law, which, among other things, includes patents, copyrights, and trademarks. 
Transferring Grotius’ reflections to intellectual property entails restrictions on private 
rights in that domain. Intellectual property law should compensate inventors and may set 
incentives, but acknowledge no further benefits for inventors. Although I continue to talk 
about Grotius, these arguments are also available in the secularization of his account.   
Parallel to how Grotius points out that use of the sea is consistent with everybody 
else’s use of it, Thomas Jefferson classically makes this point about intellectual property: 
If nature has made any one thing less susceptible than others of exclusive 
property, it is the action of the thinking power called an idea…. Its peculiar 
                                                 
19 For the more recent development of the law of the seas, see Malanczuk (1997), chapter 12. 
 
  18character… is that no one possesses it the less, because every other possesses the 
whole of it. That ideas should be freely spread from one to another over the globe, 
for the moral and mutual instruction of man, and improvement of his condition, 
seems to have been…. designed by nature….. Society may give an exclusive right 
to the profits arising from them, as an encouragement…. to pursue ideas which 
may produce utility, but this may or may not be done, according to the will and 
convenience of the society, without claim or complaints by anybody.
20  
 
There is a point to having private property in things like apples since only one person can 
make certain kinds of use of them. There is no such point in having private property 
rights in either the sea or intellectual products. Gains for occupiers, certainly in the case 
of ideas, do not depend on excluding others, if we talk about actual use of ideas, rather 
than profits accrued from the exclusion.  
Mare Liberum also argues for the freedom of the seas by appeal to its relevance 
for trade:  
For even that ocean wherewith God hath compassed the earth is navigable on 
every side round about, and the settled or extraordinary blasts of wind, not always 
blowing from the same quarter, and sometimes from every quarter, do they not 
sufficiently signify that nature hath granted a passage from all nations unto all? 
(ML, p 10; see also pp 49, 51) 
  
Similarly, not only does use of ideas by others not subtract anything from their usefulness 
for others, it adds to it. Everybody benefits from a situation in which ideas are left 
unappropriated (given, in particular, that anybody’s use of them does not interfere with 
everybody else’s use), whereas only a few would benefit, respectively, if the 
appropriation of ideas were protected by social and legal norms. Of course, were we to 
change intellectual property arrangement now, some would be made worse off by such 
changes (so not everybody would benefit from these changes), namely, those who so far 
had been allowed to appropriate ideas, respectively. Yet what I have argued does hold 
                                                 
20 Jefferson, “The Invention of Elevators” (Letter, 1813); quoted in Shriffin (2001), p 138).  
 
  19from an ex-ante standpoint in which no intellectual property arrangements have been 
made yet and from which we must assess what sort of private rights to intellectual 
property (if any) there should be.  
The seas cannot be occupied, says Grotius, and in certain, straightforward ways of 
understanding what it is to occupy something, that is certainly true of ideas. One can keep 
ideas secret, or distract people from them, but one cannot do anything to an idea that 
keeps it from being independently grasped by others. One cannot do anything to an idea 
parallel to how, in the case of land, “the beginning of Possession is joining Body to 
Body” (DJB, II.8.VI). A body A joined to another, B, takes up room that is thereby 
inaccessible for C to take up. A’s being joined to B decreases the space for C to be joined 
to B. But a mind’s grasping an idea decreases no other mind’s capacity to do so. One 
might object that one can indeed “occupy” ideas in the sense that there could be (and in 
fact are) norms of intellectual property ownership, such as patent law and copyright law. 
But, crucially, “occupation” of ideas is possible only through the acceptance of such 
norms. One can occupy an apple by eating it and thus exclude others from doing the 
same; and one can (in a meaningful sense) occupy a physical location by standing there 
and doing something with it, and thus exclude others from doing the same 
simultaneously. These activities do not per se require social norms (though respect of 
others for what one has done with a physical location might). But since indeed one 
mind’s grasping an idea decreases no other mind’s capacity to do so, the occupation of 
ideas is entirely a matter of social norms. Such norms require a renunciation on the side 
of all others to do something with ideas that they can naturally do simultaneously with 
others. This observation then raises the question of why others ought to accept such 
  20norms, a question that, in turn, takes us back to the other considerations against 
privatization that we discussed.  
Yet these parallels do not constrain private intellectual property rights, at least not 
quite in the way in which Grotius’ reflections restricted ownership of the seas. In that 
case, we first argued that the earth was collectively owned, which created a presumption 
against privatization that must be overcome. In a second step we argued that, for the seas, 
this presumption cannot be overcome: no new property arrangements were needed, were 
sensible, or otherwise acceptable for the seas. For intellectual property, certain 
considerations  would support limitations on privatization were  there a presumption 
against privatization. A ready way of arguing for such a presumption is to show that there 
is an Intellectual Common in the same way in which there is a Global Common. A 
straightforward way of arguing that, in turn, is to defend a kind of realism about 
intellectual products.  
Such realism denies that scientific, musical, literary, or other artistic works are 
literally “products” of the mind. Instead, they exist outside the realm of either material or 
mental objects. They belong to a “third realm” of non-mental super-sensible entities, 
distinct from both the sensible external world and the internal world of consciousness. 
Alleged “products” of the mind would be such products only in the sense that a conscious 
mind can discover them. There would be no invention, refinement, or other contribution 
to these entities.
21 This view delivers a presumption against privatizing elements of this 
                                                 
21 Gottlob Frege’s 1918 essay “Der Gedanke: Eine Logische Untersuchung” (“The Thought: A Logical 
Investigation“) is a locus classicus for this view, although I am, for the sake of the argument, offering an 
extreme version of it. See Gideon Rosen’s entry on abstract objects at the online Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abstract-objects/ For a general background discussion of 
abstract objects and questions of their existence, see Burgess and Rosen (1997). 
 
  21third realm. For objects in that realm exist prior to any human activities. In a second step 
we could add the considerations against privatization we extracted from Grotius’ 
discussion of the sea, to show that this presumption is hard to overcome.
22  
To be sure, this presumption can be overcome. First, individuals may fairly claim 
compensation for investments in making ideas accessible. Second, consistent with this 
argument for limitations on private intellectual property rights is for societies to set 
incentives to stimulate creativity. Yet in a next step I argue that this presumption 
excludes, or anyway offers heavy resistance to, considerations supportive of benefits or 
private intellectual property rights for inventors for reasons other than compensation and 
incentive-setting. This presumption has this effect regardless of which larger strategy of 
arguing for stronger private intellectual property one may choose, such as an approach in 
terms of natural law, in terms of a hypothetical contract between inventors and society, 
general considerations of distributive justice, or in terms of rewards for contributions 
made. I use a guarded formulation (“excludes, or anyway offers heavy resistance”) partly 
because all these strategies have been explored extensively in the literature on the 
foundations of intellectual property and so it would be hard to do justice to them here; 
and partly because it is hard to establish this point conclusively. Perhaps there are 
considerations I am unaware of, and disagreement may remain with regard to the relative 
strength of different considerations, more than we can sort out now. Yet we can establish 
this conclusion with regard to considerations commonly entertained in the literature. 
                                                 
22 For two of these considerations it should be clear how this works, that is, for the consideration that use of 
ideas by one person does not preclude others from using and benefiting from them, and that un-
appropriated ideas benefit everybody but appropriated ideas only benefit a few. What about the point that 
ideas cannot be occupied in the sense in which, say, apples or land can be occupied? One might say ideas 
too can be occupied, namely through intellectual property protection. Yet such occupation can only be 
socially accomplished, if people generally abide by it. It is before the background of this move that the 
other considerations show why people could not reasonably be expected to abide by such protection.  
 
  22Acknowledging compensation and incentive-setting as reasons for creating 
private intellectual property rights, we leave open much potential for disagreement about 
how far-reaching rights these considerations create.  Notice the following articulation of 
this point by Judge Frank Easterbrock that we will revisit below:  
A patent gives the inventor the right to exclude competition for 20 years, and thus 
to collect an enhanced price for that period. Is 20 years too long, too short, or just 
right? No one knows. A copyright lasts the life of the author plus an additional 
period that Congress keeps increasing in response to producers’ lobbying. What is 
the right length of a copyright? No one knows. A trademark lasts forever (or at 
least for as long as the product is made, and the name does not become generic in 
the public’s mind). A trade secret (such as the formula for Coca-Cola, or the 
source code of a computer program) lasts as long as the developer can keep the 
secret. Are these durations optimal? No one knows. How much use, and by 
whom, should be permitted without compensation under the fair use doctrine? No 
one knows. (Easterbrock (2001), p 406)  
 
7. Let us look at some arguments for more extensive rights to private property, assuming 
an Intellectual Common. To begin with, there is the argument that protecting inventions 
does not make anybody worse off. Those inventions would not exist without the 
inventor.
23 Waldron (1993b) replies that one may well be made worse off by inventions. 
Suppose I am dying of a disease for which there is no cure yet. Suppose somebody finds 
one, but that cure is inaccessible to me. Then I am not merely dying, but I am dying 
knowing I could be cured. Waldron quotes a 1907 textbook to illustrate Nozick’s view, 
which captures the opposite attitude from Jefferson’s: 
It is as though in some magical way he [a patent holder] had caused springs of 
water to flow in the desert or loam to cover barren mountains or fertile islands to 
rise from the bottom of the sea. His gains consist in something which no one 
loses, even while he enjoys them.
24  
                                                 
23 Nozick (1974), pp 178-182.  
 
24 John Bates Clark, Essentials of Economic Theory (1907), pp 360-361; in Waldron (1993b), p 866.  A 
similar attitude is expressed in Bainbridge (1992): “The basic reason for intellectual property law is that a 
man should own what he produces, that is, what he brings into being. If what he produces can be taken 
  23 
While Waldron’s reply goes a long way towards answering Nozick, the issue is mute if 
there is an Intellectual Common. The person who made the water flow hit on something 
standing under a presumption against privatization. He should be compensated, but 
cannot demand rewards based on the (now irrelevant) fact that nobody is worse off.  
This argument may seem implausible when creativity matters a lot.  In many 
cases of scientific discovery, and perhaps in some cases of artistic innovation, different 
people work towards a breakthrough at the same time, in much the same way in which 
Robert Scott and Roald Amundsen were simultaneously racing towards the South Pole. 
Innovation draws on achievements of predecessors on which different people may build 
at the same time. But in some cases of scientific discovery and in many cases of artistic 
invention, it would be peculiar to say this. Becker (1993) refers to the Borges story 
“Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote,” a story about someone who devotes his life to 
re-writing (re-inventing) Don Quixote from scratch. Menard seeks to mimic Cervantes’ 
mid-setting at the time of writing his master piece and to reproduce it, not from memory, 
but indeed from scratch. The reason why this is absurd – in ways in which it is not absurd 
that Scot and Amundsen simultaneously raced towards the pole, or that Newton and 
Leibniz invented the basic ideas of calculus at roughly the same time – is that Cervantes’ 
artistic achievements seem so essentially tied to the functioning of his mind that even 
somebody who knows precisely what he knew would write a different novel.
25  
                                                                                                                                                 
from him, he is no better of than a slave. Intellectual property is, therefore, the most basic form of property 
because a man uses nothing to produce is other than his mind” (p 17).  
 
25 Becker (1993) also offers an illustration from a scientific context of the phenomenon that achievements 
are sometimes entirely disconnected from a societal state of knowledge and ability. He refers to the 
following statement of the mathematician Mark Kac: “’[T]here are two kinds of geniuses, the ordinary and 
the magicians. An ordinary genius is a fellow that you and I would be just as good as, if we were only 
  24To defend the view that, still, there should be no private rights beyond 
compensation and incentive-setting, one may insist that anybody who makes a discovery 
benefits from the labors of predecessors, no matter how big a leap to the invention. One 
may also say the usefulness of, or appreciation for, the invention is determined by a 
social context.
26 But the main reply to the point raised by the Borges-story continues to 
be that if indeed there is an Intellectual Common, there will be more or less demanding 
discoveries, but no inventions. This point is not rebutted by the ludicrous nature of efforts 
to recreate the Quixote, any more than we could rebut the idea that the summit of Mount 
Everest has (presumably) been reached first and in that sense been discovered by 
Edmund Hillary and Tenzing Norgay by everybody else’s inability ever to do so again. 
(Were this the case: suppose a disease permanently damaged the physical potential of 
human beings the day after their success.) If there is an Intellectual Common, some 
discoverers may be held in great awe, but they could make no inventors’ claims.   
Similar considerations apply to Child (1990)’s argument that there are infinitely 
many ideas: no inventor even makes the stock of ideas smaller. On that view, inventors 
should have rights beyond compensation and incentive-setting since they do no harm 
“removing” ideas from that pool. They bring something into our world in a way that 
makes nobody worse but some better off.
27 But again, these matters are mute if there is 
an Intellectual Common. To bestow additional plausibility on that move, recall Waldron 
(1993b), who thinks about property rights from the standpoint of those who are supposed 
                                                                                                                                                 
many times better.’ But for the second kind, ‘even after we understand what they have done, the process by 
which they have done it is completely dark…’” (Becker (1993), p 617, note 22).  
 
26 See Hettinger (1989) on those two considerations.  
 
27 See also Moore (1997).  
 
  25to comply with them. If there is an Intellectual Common, we need not appeal to social 
value to make it reasonable to resist compliance with demanding private rights. The 
metaphysical status of ideas renders such compliance unreasonable.  
 
8. We needed strong assumptions to endorse the presumption against privatization that 
was central to these arguments. Realism about abstract objects, although controversial, is 
not outlandish. Yet we have not merely assumed that basic ideas, foundational themes, 
literary motives, or basic plots are elements of the realm of non-mental supersensory 
objects, but that the objects of patents and copyrights themselves are such elements, that 
is, finished scientific inventions, completed copyrighted poems, particular drawings, etc. 
We have made an assumption of realism about entities that bear a producer’s distinct 
touch. Much patent law has been concerned “with the meaning and the characteristics of 
inventiveness and creativity, seeking to identify the locus of true innovation” (Lachlan 
(2005), p 107), and this strong realism makes these efforts look peculiar. A weaker form 
would place only basic components into the third realm, but this move would also 
weaken the presumption against privatization.  To arrive at a plausible position, we must 
not base our argument on such strong realism about intellectual products. I will now 
show that we should restrict private intellectual property rights to compensation and 
incentive-setting regardless of whether we endorse such strong realism.  
Consider a characterization of intellectual products that overemphasizes the 
subjective aspect mirroring how our earlier characterization overemphasized the 
objective aspect. According to this characterization, intellectual products are not 
discovered, but invented and created. There is no Fregian third realm, no Intellectual 
  26Common, no presumption against privatization.
28 We cannot even state that we instead 
have a presumption in favor of privatization because there is no starting point with regard 
to which anything could be privatized. But we now have a presumption in favor of private 
rights, potentially much beyond what compensation and incentive-setting license.  
But crucially, what we above identified as considerations against privatization 
reenter. These considerations were: that ideas cannot actually be occupied in the same 
sense in which, say, land can be occupied; that the gains for users of ideas do not depend 
on excluding others; and that use of ideas by others often adds to their usefulness for any 
given user of these ideas. Above, these considerations ensured the presumption against 
privatization could generally not be overcome. (The exceptions were fairness-based 
compensation and consequentialist considerations in favor of incentives for invention.) 
Now the considerations against privatization limit the extent of rights for which in this 
case there is a presumption. These considerations again ensure we consider the standpoint 
of those expected to comply with intellectual property law. Both above and here these 
considerations entail that we should limit private property rights to what we can obtain 
via appeals to fairness and incentive-setting, although they enter in different ways.  
                                                 
28 Paine (1991), which is a response to Hettinger (1989), captures the competing approaches to intellectual 
property very well: “We may begin thinking about information rights, as Hettinger does, by treating all 
ideas as part of a common pool and then deciding whether and how to allocate to individuals rights to items 
in the pool. Within this framework, ideas are conceived on the model of tangible property. Just as, in the 
absence of social institutions, we enter the world with no particular relationships to its tangible assets or 
natural resources, we have no particular claim on the world’ ideas. In this scheme, as Hettinger asserts, the 
‘burden of justification is very much on those who would restrict the maximal use of intellectual objects.’ 
(p 20) Alternatively, we may begin, as I do, by thinking of ideas in relation to their originators, who may or 
may not share their ideas with specific others or contribute them to the common pool. This approach treats 
ideas as central to personality, and the social world individuals construct of themselves. Ideas are not, in the 
first instance, freely available natural resources. They originate with people, and it is the connections 
among people, their ideas, and their relationships with others that provide a baseline for discussing rights in 
ideas. Within this conception, the burden of justification is on those who would argue for disclosure 
obligations and general access to ideas.” (p 49)  
 
  27But so far we have operated with caricature views on the ontology of the objects 
of intellectual property. The realist account unduly eliminates the contribution of human 
creativity, whereas the anti-realist account overstates the role of individual minds. This 
suggests an intermediate view, which according to Shiffrin (2001) would   
locate only the subject matter and materials of intellectual products in the 
commons, for example, facts, concepts, ideas, propositions, literary themes, 
musical themes, and values. Authors discover these things and their 
interconnections. They make them publicly accessible by expressing them, often, 
in unique ways. (p 159)
29  
 
As Shiffrin also remarks, the proper characterization of the metaphysical nature of 
the objects of intellectual property law may not be in terms of such a view “in between” 
the extreme views. Instead, the proper view might be a domain-specific hybrid that holds 
that the appropriate characterization depends on the sort of intellectual product we are 
talking about. In any case, the argument for limiting private rights to compensation and 
incentive-setting applies across the board. The same results follow for the regulation of 
intellectual property regardless of whether we have a third realm of ideas or whether 
ideas are human creations. The ontological status of particular intellectual products will 
have to be characterized to some extent in terms of components readily placed into a third 
realm, and to some extent by appeal to human creativity. (One of these extents may be 
vanishing.) So to the extent that we must appeal to something in that third realm, the 
considerations used for that case apply; to the extent that we are talking about products of 
                                                 
29 I am indebted to Shiffrin’s article for this part of my argument. Shiffrin’s concern is with Lockean 
approaches to intellectual property. She argues that the presumption against privatization that comes from 
the idea of original collective ownership has often been underestimated in Lockean accounts of private 
intellectual property.  In her view, Locke’s “mixing” account of privatization does not provide a foundation 
for privatization per se, but creates a way of assessing which individuals would be allowed to occupy 
something. Given a presumption against privatization, Lockean accounts of property deliver considerable 
constraints on the possibility of private intellectual property.  For opposing understandings on the Lockean 
approach to property, see Hughes (1988), Becker (1993), Child (1990) and Moore (1997).  
 
  28the human mind, the considerations given in that case apply. Either way the respective 
argument generates the same constraints on private rights. Therefore, these constraints 
apply to the whole range of intellectual property.
30   
  By way of comparison, consider Shiffrin (2001)’s strategy. Shiffrin argues that 
we can dispense with an appeal to a third realm of intellectual products (with regard to 
which all human beings would presumably be related symmetrically) to support the idea 
of an Intellectual Common. Instead, she postulates an Intellectual Common even on the 
very subjective view of the ontology of intellectual products: “Creations could become 
part of the common – available equally to all – when their nature did not require 
exclusive use, to symbolize the equal moral status of individuals” (p 164). Shiffrin uses 
what I call the considerations against privatization to postulate an Intellectual Common 
regardless of ontological facts about intellectual products.  Drawing on Locke, she 
argues: (The “first” view mentioned is the one that stipulates an independent existence of 
intellectual products, the “second” is hers as just sketched)  
Locke’s writings do not directly develop the foundations of the common property 
presumption. But there is reason to favor the second understanding. It, unlike the 
first, reflects the themes that initially animate Locke: the emphasis on equality, 
the connection between equality and common ownership, and reasoning about 
property in light of its nature – that is, in light of what is necessary to make full 
and robust use of it. The qualities of intellectual property strongly engage these 
Lockean themes – especially the facts that exclusive use if generally unnecessary 
for its proper use and that, to the contrary, its full exploitation commonly depends 
on nonexclusive use. These features generate moral reasons to regard intellectual 
products as part of the intellectual common, even if they are pure authorial 
creations. (p 164)  
  
                                                 
30 To use a mathematical analogy: We have offered an argument for two extreme cases, and now have 
argued that the same argument also holds for the intermediate cases that can be understood as convex 
combinations of the extreme cases.  
 
  29I have argued that the considerations against privatization play different roles depending 
on the metaphysical status of ideas, but that we arrive at the same constraints on the 
regulation of intellectual property regardless of whether there is an Intellectual Common. 
Shiffrin seeks to establish an Intellectual Common independently of metaphysical ideas 
about the objects of intellectual property. I think this slightly mischaracterizes the work 
done by the considerations against privatization. But that is a minor disagreement.   
 
9. Let me summarize what we have argued so far. In a first step, I have explained how 
natural ownership rights give rise to associative rights at the level of the state system per 
se. Such rights guarantee that the imposition of the system of states is acceptable to co-
owners. From Grotius we took the idea of the earth being collectively owned by 
humanity, and that collective ownership delivers a presumption against privatization. We 
returned to Grotius for the second step of our discussion. We looked at his exploration of 
the question of whether all collectively owned space was open to private appropriation. 
While we saw that Grotius’ discussion of the seas is of dubious plausibility nowadays, it 
carries over to intellectual property. Our main result was that intellectual property should 
be regulated such that only limited rights to private intellectual property are 
acknowledged, determined by considerations of compensation and incentives only. We 
obtained that result independently of the ontological status of the objects of intellectual 
property rights, although that status mattered for the characterization of the precise 
reasoning behind the respective conclusions.   
The third step is to bring these trains of thought together to show that there is a 
human right to vital pharmaceuticals, as follows: The argument in the first step does 
  30some work towards the development of a particular conception of human rights; the 
argument in the second step helps us make sense of a human right to essential 
pharmaceuticals within that conception. Let me elaborate first, on the sense in which we 
have done work towards a conception of human rights. According to the conception in 
question, human rights are membership rights in the global political and economic order. 
The global order is the system of states that covers most of the land masses of the earth, 
as well as the network of organizations that, without constituting an actual government, 
provides for what has come to be called “global governance.” These membership rights 
are partially derived from the standpoint of collective ownership as explained above. But 
as we will see, there are other bases too from which membership rights can be derived.  
Being a member of that order means to live on the territory covered by it and to 
be subject to those bits of this interlocking system of jurisdictions that apply to one’s 
situation. Nothing more is meant by “membership.” By now all human beings are 
members in this sense. There being enough structure to the global order to render that 
very term applicable, as well as an accompanying capacity for coordinated action, is a 
condition for the existence of rights held within that order. And, indeed, there is enough 
structure because of the existence of organizations that are designed for, and in fact do 
concern themselves with, global problem-solving. Think of the population of the world as 
being contained in one large set, and of the global order as captured by relations among 
members of that set. All citizens of a given country stand in one such relation; all persons 
whose countries are in the WTO in another, etc. Membership rights in this order will be 
  31rights individuals hold qua members of this set with those structures imposed on, where 
these internal differentiations matter when it comes to responsibilities.
31  
Such a conception of human rights, in virtue of resorting to features of an 
empirically contingent but relatively abiding world order, makes the applicability of 
human rights as understood on this account itself contingent. Individuals across history 
have not always held them, nor would those rights apply to a fictitious colony of humans 
on the back side of the moon should such a community be discovered. This does not 
mean one could do with such people as one pleases, but they would not be members of 
the global order. The main advantages of the present account – which I think are virtues 
considerable enough to compensate for counterintuitive nature and implications of the 
connections between human rights, membership in the global order, and collective 
ownership --  are that it readily makes clear why talk about “rights” is appropriate here 
(rather than talk about values or goals), and that it provides a non-parochial grounding of 
human rights in plausible starting points, which unlike, say, Griffin’s (2008) view does 
not require inquiries into the nature of personhood, autonomy, or agency.  
In light of the sheer relevance of the kind of thing whose ownership is at stake for 
all human purposes, one cannot simply reject this account as missing the point of 
“human” rights because it does not focus on providing content to the term “human.” At 
any rate, ideas about universality that feed into our understanding of human rights are 
sufficiently complex to make it implausible that there will be a single philosophically 
                                                 
31 One worry that may arise here is that such rights will not apply to everybody. (What of North Korea?) 
Note two things. First, membership, as explained above, does not depend on the participation of one’s 
country in political and economic activities of the global order. The existence of organizations of global 
reach is important only to fend off the objection that there is not enough structure to render talk of 
membership rights meaningful. Second, more importantly, the task of establishing whether membership 
rights hold for everybody falls to the discussion of the different bases on which these rights can be held. 
Rights that can be derived from collective ownership do apply to everybody, but others indeed may not.  
 
  32most successful conception of human rights. Different conceptions capture different 
aspects of our common ideas about human rights. The conception offered here cannot 
plausibly exhaust what we want to say about human rights.
32   
The defining feature of human rights in this view is that they are important moral 
demands against authority as it applies to individuals in their immediate environment and 
that are at the same time also matters of urgent global concern.
33 To argue that X is a 
human right, what is required in a first, preliminary step is that X be shown to be a matter 
of urgency in the affected agents’ immediate environment, and then, second, that a 
genuinely global concern can be established. Again, there is no reason to think the only 
way in which something can become of global concern in a manner that renders the 
language of rights appropriate is that common ownership rights need to be protected. On 
                                                 
32 (1) Cohen (2006) proposes that human rights have three features: they are universal and owed by every 
political society to everybody; they are requirements of political morality whose force does not depend on 
their expression in enforceable law; and they are especially urgent requirements. Any more particular 
account, says Cohen, has to meet these constraints, as well as two methodological assumptions: fidelity to 
the major human rights documents, so that a substantial range of these rights is accounted for; and open-
endedness (we can argue in support of additional rights). These criteria do not entail commitments with 
regard to a range of questions about such rights. It is the function of a conception of human rights to 
provide a fuller set of answers to such questions. For instance, accepting these criteria does not imply that 
human rights must be understood as protecting essential features of personhood, though it is consistent with 
such an approach.  A different way of adding detail to these criteria is to think of “human” rights as rights 
individuals hold qua members of the global and political order that ipso facto but contingently includes 
everybody. That is what the present conception does. (2) A conception that understands human rights as 
membership rights in the global order must be distinguished from Cohen’s (2006) conception in terms of 
membership rights in political society. Cohen’s notion of membership is that “a person’s good is to be 
taken into account by the political society’s basic institutions: to be treated as a member is to have one’s 
good given due consideration, both in the processes of arriving at authoritative collective decisions and in 
the content of those decisions” (Cohen (2006), p 237 f).Human rights then are rights individuals hold in 
their respective communities to ensure inclusion. In the conception I defend rights that ensure inclusion in 
political communities will be among those that are the global order’s responsibility, but this is so via an 
additional argument. For individuals everywhere to have a claim to something vis-à-vis their respective 
community does not suffice for this to be a claim of urgent global concern, in the sense that violations 
somewhere should be of serious concern to people everywhere or to global institutions. The difference 
between these two kinds of membership captures an ambiguity that permeates human rights talk, namely, 
whether such rights in the first instance apply to each individual, or else are of global relevance. If one 
endorses the first stance, the question becomes why others far away should care; if the second, the question 
becomes how much of what is of fundamental importance to individuals can be incorporated. 
 
33 I stated at the beginning that I took this reference to authority to be part of the concept of human rights.  
 
  33the contrary, a strength of this conception is that it can accommodate a range of reasons 
why certain matters should concern the world as a whole.  
Additional bases might be substantive or procedural. Since little of the details will 
matter later, I will be brief.
34 As far as substantive bases are concerned, one can argue in 
at least three ways that something should be of global concern. First, one might argue that 
this is so on the basis of mutual enlightened self-interest. For example, it may be 
necessary or conducive for the preservation of peace that authority is exercised in certain 
ways, based on the idea that unchecked governmental authority will also be abusive vis-
à-vis others, or create negative externalities (refugees, etc). Second, one may argue that 
something is of global concern because there is a shared causal responsibility for the 
matter at hand that arises out of global interconnectedness.  
A third substantive basis, a collective category, involves moral considerations that 
do not turn on interconnectedness. The ownership standpoint could be enlisted here too, 
but we have discussed it. Such considerations include appeals to a natural duty of aid 
(which would have to be acknowledged independently and does not turn on particular 
features of the global order), as well as possible duties of rectification (where it would 
have to be shown that the global order per se owes the rectification). In each case where 
such an appeal to a moral consideration is made, it will be crucial to offer an argument 
for why something is of urgent global concern – and this is precisely the argument we 
make below with regard to a right to vital pharmaceuticals. The second kind of basis is 
procedural. One way in which concerns can become common within a certain political 
structure, and one way in which they can become membership rights within that 
                                                 
34 For more details, see Risse (2009) and Risse (forthcoming).  
 
  34structure, is for them to come to be widely regarded as such, as a result of an authoritative 
process. Proposed “human rights” may receive support on any or all of these bases, and 
the strength of support arising from each basis may vary. Not all bases from which 
membership rights are derived apply equally to all individuals. A critical discourse can 
occur if a proposed right fails to receive support in all these ways.  
 
10. So is there a human right to vital pharmaceuticals? To make that case, we need to 
show first that access to pharmaceuticals is a matter of urgency in the affected agents’ 
immediate environment, and then, second, to establish an urgent global concern. I take it 
that the preliminary step is met for essential pharmaceuticals.
35 Possibly, my conception 
of human rights offers other resources to that end, but I seek to establish an urgent global 
concern through considerations of intellectual property.  
At first sight, the second step of our argument seems to speak against there being 
such a concern.  That second step provides us with a moral standpoint for assessing the 
regulation of intellectual property whenever such regulation takes place. What that 
standpoint does, however, is merely to clarify what sort of reasons bears on the 
determination of private intellectual property rights. This is compatible with much 
variation. (Recall the Easterbrock quote.) Compensation is compensation for materials 
used, but also for time invested. Then the question is how highly societies should value 
an inventor’s time, compared to the time of others. Also, some societies may care more 
about fostering innovation than others. (Recall concluding part of the Jefferson quote.) 
One may say such regulation ought to be left to domestic law partly because no 
                                                 
35 For the connection between health and social justice, see Hofrichter (2003) and Wilkinson (1996); see 
also chapter 6 in Barry (2005), Waldron (1993a), and Daniels (1985).  
 
  35prescriptions other than constraints on the kinds of reasons that can be used follow from 
this standpoint, but also because such an assignment lets countries shape their 
comparative advantage. But if intellectual property explicitly ought not to be regulated 
globally, we find no human right to vital pharmaceuticals in this conception if the goal is 
to establish one via considerations of intellectual property.  
  Alas, nowadays, there is international regulation of intellectual property, notably 
through TRIPs. To that agreement the conclusions of the second step apply. We have 
shown that wherever intellectual property indeed is regulated, it has to abide by certain 
constraints. This conclusion leads to a critical assessment of TRIPs: As private rights 
ought to be limited to compensation and incentives, and as it is implausible that either of 
these would impose obligations on very poor countries, TRIPs should not impose burdens 
on them. The wealth differential between rich and poor is so large that compensation and 
incentives for the pharmaceutical industry do not depend on markets in these countries. 
Modulo adding an economic analysis, we obtain this result from reflections on 
intellectual property without saying anything about human rights.
36  
                                                 
36 (1) This argument does not engage with the moral acceptability of TRIPs in ways internal to 
considerations of compensation and incentive-setting.  For instance, Maskus and Reichman (2005b) argue 
that TRIPs has given rise to a transnational system of innovation that could produce powerful incentives to 
innovate for the benefit of mankind, if developed properly. Usual arguments supportive of strengthening 
intellectual property protections even in developing countries include: the ability to build local research and 
development; to attract technology transfers; and to attract foreign direct investment. The economist Joan 
Robinson once spoke of the “paradox of patents:” “The justification of the patent system is that by slowing 
down the diffusion of technical progress it ensures that there will be more progress to diffuse” (Robinson 
(1958),p 87, quoted in Streckx (2005), p 197. As far as TRIPs is concerned, the question is whether the 
long term effects in terms of “more progress to diffuse” are sufficiently great to warrant the short-term 
costs not merely in terms of “slowing down the diffusion of technical progress,” but also in terms of the 
more or less direct consequences of this slow-down (such as hampered access to medications). (2) One 
might say one concern behind TRIPs is to undermine certain possibilities of drug smuggling that benefits 
from the existence of countries without strong patent protection. However, I take it that the arguments in 
this study (in particular the argument for there being a human right to essential pharmaceuticals we are 
about to present) entail that different policies must be implemented to solve that problem, rather than the 
introduction of overly strong private intellectual property rights that – crucially -- require a plausibility 
independently of their effect on the smuggling of pharmaceuticals.  
 
  36  Can we also derive a human right to vital pharmaceuticals by enlisting 
considerations of intellectual property, despite the reasoning to the contrary presented 
earlier? We can if we can demonstrate an urgent concern at the global level with the 
regulation of a particular sub-domain of intellectual property that includes essential 
pharmaceuticals -- regardless of existing treaties, such as TRIPs, that may or may not 
have come about because of such a concern. Then the argument of the second step 
imposes constraints on the regulation of that sub-domain. To this end, we can offer two 
arguments. According to the first, the conclusion that the regulation of vital 
pharmaceuticals is a matter of urgent global concern emerges in the following three steps.   
First, it follows from our reflections on intellectual property that for a certain 
domain of such property, there is a presumption that indeed it should be regulated 
globally. This domain includes those ideas tied to an underlying metaphysical picture in 
which it does make sense to speak of a discovery and an Intellectual Common. In that 
domain, any two human beings are symmetrically located with regard to ideas. There is 
then a prima facie case for global regulation parallel to the case for a global approach to 
the use of the three-dimensional space of the earth (with regard to which any two human 
beings are also located symmetrically), namely, to preserve this symmetry of all human 
beings with regard to the respective common. Second, pharmaceuticals are in this domain 
because they draw on physiochemical properties of molecules. Such properties are among 
the most plausible entities for which it makes sense to say they were discovered and exist 
in an Intellectual Common. These properties are what they are regardless of human 
activities, and regardless of whether it took ingenuity, effort, or serendipity to uncover 
them. And third, within the domain of those ideas with regard to which this prima facie 
  37case for international regulation is plausible (i.e., those that are in an Intellectual 
Common), entities immediately connected to basic human needs make for an especially 
plausible and urgent case, and this includes vital pharmaceuticals. There is therefore an 
urgent global concern with the regulation of vital pharmaceuticals.
37  
This argument identifies what I have called an independent moral reason for there 
being an urgent global concern with the regulation of intellectual property in a certain 
domain. This argument also rebuts the objection that draws on the earlier considerations 
against global regulation of intellectual property, although that objection continues to 
apply to those domains of intellectual property not captured by the argument just offered. 
Alas, these gains come at a price: this first argument does make a rather serious 
ontological commitment to realism about the content of the driving ideas behind 
pharmaceutical patents, a commitment that is essential to the argument because the 
symmetry of any two individuals with regard to these ideas depends on it. It is welcome 
news, therefore, that there is a second way of identifying an independent moral reason for 
there being an urgent global concern with the regulation of vital pharmaceuticals.  
This second argument does not turn on any ontological commitments about the 
subjects of intellectual property law. Recall that our conclusion in the second part of this 
paper was that wherever intellectual property law indeed is regulated, this regulation 
ought to abide by certain constraints, namely, acknowledge only compensation and 
incentive-setting as acceptable bases for private intellectual property rights. We saw 
above that this generates a critical assessment of TRIPs. More generally, then, we can 
                                                 
37 One might think we could obtain this result by a plain appeal to needs. Perhaps so, but then the argument 
rests entirely on the notion of needs. My argument avoids this, and I think is the stronger for enlisting 
metaphysical considerations about the status of particular ideas (here: biochemical properties of molecules). 
 
  38formulate an implication of the main result of the second part of our argument, as 
follows: There ought to be no regulation of intellectual property law in particular at the 
global level that grants private intellectual property rights that go beyond what we can 
obtain by way of compensation and incentive-setting.  
This argument too identifies what I have called an independent moral reason for 
there being an urgent global concern with the regulation of intellectual property. Whereas 
the first argument we just presented identified the symmetry of any two individuals with 
regard to the underlying ideas of a certain domain of intellectual property as such a 
reason (and was based on particular, and controversial, ontological commitments), this 
second argument re-enlists the considerations against privatization that we extracted from 
Grotius to identify an independent moral reason against property regulations of a certain 
sort at the global level. (Recall that these considerations were: that ideas cannot actually 
be occupied in the same sense in which, say, land can be occupied; that the gains for 
users of ideas do not depend on excluding others; and that use of ideas by others often 
adds to their usefulness for any given user of these ideas.) So whereas the first argument 
identifies a reason in favor of regulation of a certain sort at the global level, the second 
argument identifies a reason against regulation of a certain sort.  Put yet differently, the 
first argument formulates a positive case for regulation of vital pharmaceuticals at the 
global level and then, in a second stage, brings to bear the considerations we extracted 
from Grotius to formulate limitations on private property rights; as opposed to that, the 
second argument dispenses with that positive case, and this with the first stage of that 
first argument, altogether, and makes its case only in terms of the Grotian considerations 
against privatization.  
  39But since there indeed is regulation at the global level now, and since global 
interconnectedness makes it inevitable that some property regime or other is in place at 
the global level regardless of whether there is one particular treaty (such as TRIPs) 
governing that regime,
38 both of these arguments have the same implications. That is, 
neither of these arguments generates a claim against anybody actually to invent vital 
medications that are not yet available. But both arguments entail that it is owed to people 
across the world that intellectual property generally and vital pharmaceuticals in 
particular not be regulated in a way that acknowledges far-reaching private intellectual 
property rights – especially (but not only) at the global level. In that sense, there indeed is 
a human right to pharmaceuticals: a right against constraints on access to pharmaceuticals 
on behalf of overblown private intellectual property rights.   
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